BLG Alert: Trade Secret Disclosure in Litigation – The Federal Advantage

Introduction

Since Congress enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) nearly a decade ago, federal courts have struggled with the substance and timing of trade secret disclosures. For example, many federal courts in California have adopted a form of California’s requirement of early and detailed trade secret disclosures before a plaintiff may begin discovery. The application of California’s gatekeeping rule can significantly delay progress in trade secret cases.

The Ninth Circuit has now signaled a shift away from that approach in its recent decision in Quintara Biosciences v. Ruifeng Biztech. There, the court departed from a strict up‑front trade secret disclosure, instead approving a more iterative approach that allows refinement of the identified trade secrets at issue over the course of discovery. This shift may make federal courts a more plaintiff-friendly trade secrets forum.

State Law Constraints in California, Massachusetts, and Beyond

Under California Civil Procedure Code § 2019.210, trade secret plaintiffs must identify the asserted secrets with “reasonable particularity” before serving discovery. The aim is to discourage fishing expeditions in which plaintiffs seek broad discovery while taking a wait-and-see approach to identifying the secrets at issue.

In practice, this is powerful tool for defendants to delay or deny discovery and limit the case against them. Plaintiffs are forced to narrow their trade secret list early, and defendants can seize on this narrowing to limit both discovery and the scope of alleged misappropriation.

Massachusetts has a similar statute. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93 § 42(D)(b). It requires, before discovery may begin, identification of the trade secret with “sufficient particularity under the circumstances of the case to allow the court to determine the appropriate parameters of discovery and to enable reasonably other parties to prepare their defense.”

Beyond these statutory mandates, many courts have developed early trade secret disclosure practices under common law. Delaware state courts require a “reasonably particular” pre‑discovery disclosure of asserted trade secrets, although they also allow the plaintiff to refine its list of secrets during discovery. See SmithKline Beecham Pharms. Co. v. Merck & Co., 766 A.2d 442, 447-48 (Del. 2000). Courts that have considered state trade secret claims in at least Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, New York, and North Carolina have also enforced common law pre-discovery disclosure, typically via an early interrogatory response.^[1]  

Federal Court Approach Under the DTSA

As noted, many federal courts have required an early disclosure process similar to California’s. That appears to be changing for DTSA claims.

The Ninth Circuit in Quintara Biosciences v. Ruifeng Biztech held that under the DTSA, the sufficiency of a trade secret identification is a question for fact for summary judgment or trial. No. 23-16093, 2025 WL 2315671, at *2-4 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2025) (citing InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Global Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 657-59 (9th Cir. 2020)). It applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the DTSA analysis, not the California disclosure rule. In reversing, the court held that the district court had abused its discretion by striking the trade secrets in the defendant’s disclosure under Rule 12(f) because even if construed as a pleading, the disclosure had no strikable matter under Rule 12(f). Id. at *5. The Ninth Circuit also assigned error to the district court’s striking of trade secrets as a discovery sanction, a move the court found a “harsh penalty that, given its severity, should be dispensed only in a limited set of extreme circumstances.” Id. at *6; see also id. at *7-8. The Quintara court did not go so far as to hold that trade secret identification can await the end of discovery, instead explaining that discovery in DTSA cases “requires an iterative process where requests between parties lead to a refined and sufficiently particularized trade secret identification.” Id. at *4.

The Quintara court limited its analysis to DTSA claims. It remains to be seen how federal courts will handle early trade secret identification under state law claims, such as the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act, in view of Quintara.

Practical Implications for Plaintiffs and Defendants

For plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit, and perhaps beyond, Quintara may make federal courts a more hospitable place for trade secret claims, particularly if only asserting claims under the DTSA as opposed to state-law trade secret claims. Early dismissal for lack of particularity is less likely, and plaintiffs have more running room to refine their identification during discovery.

For defendants, the ruling erodes a powerful procedural tool but does not leave them without options. Quintara confirmed the need for a “reasonably particular” trade secret identification at some point during litigation, and encouraged judges to use their authority under Rule 16 to achieve it. Defendants may therefore seek to shape the schedule in a DTSA case. Defendant’s tactics may include urging a detailed trade secret identification at the beginning of discovery or requesting an early summary judgment motion solely on the identification’s sufficiency if the plaintiff fails to engage in the iterative process Quintara mandates.

^[1] “‘A plaintiff will normally be required first to identify with reasonable particularity the matter which it claims constitutes a trade secret, before it will be allowed . . . to compel discovery of its adversary’s trade secrets.’” Ikon Office Sols. v. Konica Minolta Bus. Sols., No. 08-539, 2009 WL 4429156 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 2009) (quoting AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001)); see also DeRubeis v. Witten Techs., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 679-82 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (requiring trade secret disclosure with reasonable particularity before allowing trade-secret-related discovery of defendant); Xerox Corp. v. IBM, 64 F.R.D. 367, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same); Switch Comms. Grp. v. Ballard, No. 11-285, 2012 WL 2342929, at *3-5 (D. Nev. June 19, 2012) (same); Dura Global Techs., Inc. v. Magna Donnelly Corp., No. 07-10945, 2007 WL 4303294, at *2-5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2007) (same).

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